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JURISDICTION 
The Respondent accepts the assertion of jurisdiction in this 
court made by the Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The Respondent accepts the statement of the nature of the pro-
ceeding made by the Appellant. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is Empire entitled to reimbursement from Weyerhaeuser in 
its own right, as well as as assignor of the rights of Wilson? 
2. Was Empire's claim against Weyerhaeuser filed within the 
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitation? 
3. Did Wilson have any obligation to make payments on a 
nonexistent deed of trust? 
4. Did Weyerhaeuser fail to prove that it was entitled to an 
offset against the amount owing to Empire? 
5. Were indispensable or real parties in interest absent from 
the litigation in the lower court? 
6. Did Empire prove its allegations against Weyerhaeuser? 
7. Is Empire entitled to attorneys1 fees expended in executing 
the judgment against Weyerhaeuser? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated. 
Within six years—Mesne profits of real property - Instrument 
in writing - Distribution of criminal proceeds to victim. 
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Within six years. 
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real property. 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded 
upon an instrument, in writing, except those mention in Section 78-
12-22. 
(3) An action instituted under Section 78-11-12.5 regarding 
distribution of criminal proceeds to any victim. 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to 
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of ju-
risdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party 
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede 
his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons al-
ready parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multi-
ple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be 
made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he 
may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plain-
tiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would ren-
der the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the 
action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the latter part of 1982 Empire, the Plaintiff in this action, 
was selected as the escrow agent for a sale of a parcel of property in 
American Fork Utah. The seller was "Scott" and the buyer was 
"Wilson." As part of the sales agreement, Wilson was to assume 
Scottfs obligations under a deed of trust to Weyerhaeuser. (The ac-
tion holder of the deed of trust was Mason McDuffee-a company 
that had been wholly purchased by Weyerhaeuser. For purposes of 
this case no distinction was made between Weyerhaeuser and Mason 
McDuffee. All references to either party are to Weyerhaeuser.) 
At Empire's request Weyerhaeuser prepared and sent to Em-
pire a "beneficiary statement." (Addendum "a", record on appeal p.4) 
The beneficiary statement set forth the conditions under which Wey-
erhaeuser would accept the assumption of the obligation under the 
deed of trust it covered by Wilson. In reliance on the representa-
tions made in the beneficiary statement, Empire tendered its check 
in the amount of $5,473.04 to Weyerhaeuser. 
Weyerhaeuser cashed the check and retains the funds. 
Wilson, the purchaser, received a deed from the Scotts for the 
property. At the time of the sale and attempted assumption, and 
prior thereto, the property in question was occupied by a tenant of 
the Scotts named Papworth. At no time did Mr. Papworth make any 
rental payments to Mr. Wilson for the property. 
Prior to the attempted assumption Weyerhaeuser had fore-
closed and sold the property in question under the terms of its deed 
of trust with Scott. At the time of the representations made in the 
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beneficiary statement, as well as at the time of the attempted trans-
fer from Scott to Wilson, the deed of trust had already been fore-
closed. As a result of this foreclosure, Weyerhaeuser held all title to 
the property in question—Scott no longer owned anything and could 
no transfer any interest to Wilson.. 
Some time after the attempted closing Empire was contacted by 
attorneys for Wilson demanding substantial damages. After ex-
tended negotiations, Empire and Wilson settled and Wilson assigned 
all his interests to Empire. Subsequent thereto this action against 
Weyerhaeuser was filed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At all times relevant to this litigation Weyerhaeuser owned all 
interests in the subject property. By having sold and purchased the 
property under a power of sale in the deed of trust, Weyerhaeuser 
had terminated all interests in the property other than its own. 
Despite the fact that Weyerhaeuser had foreclosed the prop-
erty, it made representation to Empire that it would allow assump-
tion of the "deed of trust"—a deed of trust that no longer existed—by 
payment tendered in the amount of $5,473.04. Weyerhaeuser's offer 
to accept payment of this amount for assumption of the deed of trust 
was made in a written beneficiary statement. In reliance on the rep-
resentations made in the beneficiary statement, Empire tendered a 
check to Weyerhaeuser (addendum B, record on appeal at page 5) in 
the amount requested. Because the check was drawn by Empire, and 
all of the arrangements between Weyerhaeuser and Empire were 
made with Empire, Empire has a cause of action in its own right 
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against Weyerhaeuser, in addition to the claims that it derives as as-
signee from Wilson. 
The beneficiary statement, and the tendered check are the 
written offer and acceptance of that offer between the parties. The 
offer and the check form the written agreement between Empire and 
Weyerhaeuser,, As the obligation arises from these writings—and 
from nowhere else—this litigation arises directly from an agreement 
in writing and is subject to the six-year statute of limitation. 
Because Wilson received no interest in the attempted transfer 
of property, and because he never used or occupied the land, he 
owes nothing to Weyerhaeuser. Because Wilson can owe nothing to 
Weyerhaeuser, it is not entitled to an offset against the amount it 
rightfully must refund to Empire. 
The dispute between the parties can be resolved without the 
joinder of additional parties. Empire is not in privity of any type 
with the holdover tenant. Litigation concerning the rents owed by 
the tenant is between Weyerhaeuser and the tenant and does not 
affect this litigation. Similarly, Scott, the former owner, is not neces-
sary to this litigation as a cause of action against him for misrepre-
sentation is independent of this attempted assumption. 
Finally, Empire's relationship with its errors and omissions car-
rier is not of concern to Weyerhaeuser as Weyerhaeuser, under the 
collateral source rule, is not entitled to credit for amounts paid by 
the errors and omissions carrier. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EMPIRE IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM WEYERHAEUSER IN 
ITS OWN RIGHT, AS WELL AS AS ASSIGNOR OF THE RIGHTS OF WIL-
SON 
Weyerhaeuser asserts in its brief that Empire's claims for re-
turn of the $5,473.04, are derivative from Wilson only, and that be-
cause they are derivative, Empire is subject to the defenses that 
Weyerhaeuser could assert against Wilson. Interestingly, at page 13 
of its brief, Weyerhaeuser indicates that the arrangement for the as-
sumption of the loan was between Empire and Weyerhaeuser, and 
that "Wilson was not even identified on the Beneficiary Statement or 
the check." 
This litigation resulted from Weyerhaeuser's failure to inform 
Empire that Weyerhaeuser's loan on the subject property had been 
foreclosed. Because of the foreclosure, there was no loan available to 
assume. Empire relied upon that representation, a representation 
made in writing by Weyerhaeuser, in advising its client, Wilson, of 
what was required to effect assumption. By indicating to Empire 
what it would require to allow assumption of the loan, Weyerhaeuser 
contracted with Empire to accept tender of the listed amount through 
September 15, 1982. When Empire tendered its check in the amount 
requested, the offer had been accepted and the contract made. At 
that point the contract did not concern Wilson, as the parties were 
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Empire and Weyerhaeuser. Because of Weyerhaeuser's misrepre-
sentation, Empire incurred liability . That liability is an independent 
cause of action, not subject to defenses that Weyerhaeuser may have 
against Wilson. 
Assuming, however, that Empire is subject to Weyerhaeuser's 
defenses against Wilson, as will be discussed in detail in Points III 
and IV of this brief, Weyerhaeuser failed to prove that it had any 
defenses against Wilson. By failing to so prove, it is not entitled to a 
set off against the amount owed to Empire. 
POINT II 
EMPIRES CLAIM AGAINST WEYERHAEUSER WAS NOT BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
Empire's remittance of a check in the amount of $5473.04 
(Addendum B, Record on Appeal at p. 5.) was made in reliance on the 
beneficiary statement received from the defendant, Weyerhaeuser 
mortgage company. In the beneficiary statement Weyerhaeuser in-
cluded the information on the loan that was to be assumed, with the 
following additional information: 
Past due installments as of 08-26-82 3.621.00. Addi-
tional late charged will be due at 4.26 for each payment 
more than 14 days late. Assumption fee 45.00. Reserve 
shortage 51.96. Loan payments must be brought and 
kept current during this escrow as loan activity will con-
tinue. Your remittance must include all charges and costs 
listed on this statement. In addition, we require the fol-
lowing: 1. A copy of the recorded deed or other legal 
document showing the conveyance of title from our pre-
sent mortgagor to the new owner. 2. Evidence of insur-
ance in favor of the new owner. If a new policy is being 
substituted, the original policy or binder must be sub-
mitted upon closing. 3. The enclosed information form 
must be completed and returned along with copies of the 
buyers and sellers closing statements. * * * 
The form concluded by indicating that the following amounts 
were "needed": 
$3,621.00 5/81 to 9/82 
72.42 billed late charges 
45.00 transfer fee 
51.96 reserve shortage 
1,682.66 BANKRUPTCY FEES 
$5,473.04 
The form was dated "8/27/82" and was signed by Lucille R. 
Sontistella (sp.). The expiration date of the beneficiary statement 
was September 15, 1982. Empire's check in the amount of $5,743.04 
was dated September 13, 1982. 
Weyerhaeuser asserts that this beneficiary statement, and the 
subsequent check tendered in reliance thereon do not qualify as 
"writings" for the purposes of Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Anno-
tated, because they are not a "contract." 
Our Supreme Court in Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 95 Utah 490, 
80 P.2d 471 (1938), stated that an obligation "founded on an instru-
ment in writing" is one that "grows out of the written instruments." 
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Further, when an obligation is established by the writing, "a promise 
to pay or to perform is implied. By necessary inference of law and 
fact such promise is embodied in the language of the writing al-
though it may not be expressed in words." Bracklein. at 476. 
(emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court further illustrated the principles underly-
ing the "instrument in writing" rule in Evans v. Pickett Brothers 
Farms. 28 Utah 2d 125, 499 P.2d 273 (1972). In Pickett the parties 
to the litigation had made an oral agreement for land levelling work 
to be performed by the plaintiff. After the work had been com-
pleted, the defendant caused a written form to be prepared by the 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. The form was 
entitled a "purchase order" and authorized the vendor to furnish the 
farmer with the conservation materials or services described. The 
form indicated the acreage involved and that the sales price was $10 
per hour. Thereafter the defendant signed and dated the form. 
In holding that the six-year statute of limitation applied, the 
court indicated that the instrument was sufficient to imply a promise 
to pay, and qualified as an instrument in writing. 
In the instant case the beneficiary statement included all of the 
terms that the defendant, Weyerhaeuser, required for assumption of 
the loan. Empire met those requirements. However, Weyerhaeuser 
did not have anything to sell to Empire as the loan in question had 
already been foreclosed. As Weyerhaeuser was unable to perform 
under the terms of the agreement, it must certainly be implied into 
the agreement between the parties that Weyerhaeuser would return 
the amount tendered. The beneficiary statement is the foundation of 
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the transaction between the parties. It defined the terms of as-
sumption, and expressed the amount of consideration required for 
consummation. 
In Evans an instrument that was executed between the gov-
ernment agency and the defendant, without any input from the 
plaintiff, without his signature, and after he had performed his part 
of the agreement, was deemed a sufficient writing to invoke the pro-
visions of the six-year statute of limitation. It stretches reason to ar-
gue that the instrument involved here, between the parties directly 
and stating the terms of the agreement, does not also qualify as "an 
action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an in-
strument in writing." (Section 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated.) 
Weyerhaeuser erroneously argues that the beneficiary state-
ment lacked the specificity necessary to form a contract. What they 
actually mean is that Weyerhaeuser was not able to perform its obli-
gations under the agreement, because no obligation existed at that 
point in time that could be assumed. The necessary "meeting of the 
minds" occurred—Empire and its client would assume the mortgage 
upon payment of the amount demanded by Weyerhaeuser in the 
beneficiary statement. Empire performed; Weyerhaeuser could not. 
POINT III 
WILSON HAD NO OBLIGATION TO MAKE PAYMENTS ON A DEED OF 
TRUST THAT NO LONGER EXISTED 
In its discussion on point III, Weyerhaeuser takes the inter-
esting position that Wilson's failure to make payments on the deed of 
trust relieves Weyerhaeuser from returning the monies that had 
been tendered to it to assume the deed of trust. Of course, had there 
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actually been a deed of trust to assume in existence at the time of 
the attempted assumption, this litigation would not have arisen. Had 
Wilson failed to pay the obligations under the deed of trust, Weyer-
haeuser could have exercised its power of sale and foreclosed on the 
property, extinguishing all interest Wilson would have had. That ob-
viously could not take place because Weyerhaeuser already owned 
ALL interests in the property as a result of its previous foreclosure 
sale. Wilson could not be expected to make payments on an obliga-
tion that did not exist. 
To illustrate the nonsensical nature of Weyerhaeuser*s argu-
ment, one need only move the time of the discovery of the previous 
sale to a couple of days after the attempted assumption had been 
concluded. Suppose Wilson, at that point, discovered that he actually 
had received absolutely nothing for the money that he had paid to 
Weyerhaeuser—he had no title whatever to the property he thought 
he had purchased. Having so discovered his lack of ownership, he 
refused to pay the payments Weyerhaeuser demanded on the deed 
of trust that had already been foreclosed. Applying the argument 
that Weyerhaeuser now presents to this court, Wilson's failure to 
make even the first payment on a non-existent deed of trust would 
permit Weyerhaeuser to retain the $5,473.04 it had received, and 
the title to the property. 
Section 57-1-28, Utah Code Annotated, provides, in relevant 
part 
The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to 
the purchaser, without right of redemption, 
the trustee's title and all right, title, interest, 
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and claim of the trustor and his successors in 
interest and of all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them, in and to the prop-
erty sold. . . .(emphasis added.) 
After the foreclosure sale that antedated the attempted as-
sumption, Mr. Wilson's predecessors, under the provisions of the 
above-cited statute, had no interest to convey to him. Despite receipt 
of their deed, he received no interest whatever in any property. 
Weyerhaeuser's exercise of its power of sale on the property extin-
guished the deed of trust and left nothing for Mr. Wilson to assume. 
Thompson on Real Property, Section 4814, p. 672. Because he had 
actually purchased no property, and could not assume a deed of trust 
that had been extinguished by sale, he had no obligation to pay any 
money to Weyerhaeuser. 
Interestingly, Weyerhaeuser cites two cases, McCarren v. Mer-
rill. 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732 (1964) and Petersen v. Inter-
mountain Capital Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 271, 508 P.2d 536 (1973), as au-
thority for the proposition that they are excused from returning the 
money tendered to them by Wilson's failure to make mortgage pay-
ments. Indeed, these cases do stand for the proposition that perfor-
mance by one party to a contractual arrangement is excused by the 
nonperformance of the other party. Weyerhaeuser fails to apply the 
cases to the proper time frame in this transaction, however. Implicit 
in the beneficiary statement upon which payment was made was 
that a deed of trust still existed to be assumed. By sending the ben-
eficiary statement to Empire, Weyerhaeuser so represented. No such 
deed of trust existed. At that point, Weyerhaeuser had breached the 
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assumption agreement. That breach, according to the reasoning in 
the cases cited by Weyerhaeuser, excused Wilson from any further 
performance under the agreement. All that was left was for Weyer-
haeuser to return the consideration for the assumption it had no le-
gal right to accept. 
POINT IV 
WEYERHAEUSER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO AN 
OFFSET AGAINST THE AMOUNT OWING TO EMPIRE 
Weyerhaeuser argues that Wilson, and subsequently Empire, 
are liable for the unpaid mortgage payments, or for the fair rental 
value of the property, and that these amounts should be offset 
against the amount to be returned by Weyerhaeuser. Weyerhaeuser 
made claim for these amounts in its counterclaim to the Plaintiffs 
complaint. The court, however, held that Weyerhaeuser had failed to 
prove the allegations of its complaint, and dismissed the same. 
To be able to sustain a claim for offset under Section 349 of the 
Restatement of Contracts, as Weyerhaeuser attempts to do, it must 
prove that Wilson or Empire "received any interest in land or goods 
or any other property in exchange for his own performance." It is 
amply clear that Wilson received no interest whatever in the prop-
erty, so he, and subsequently Empire, can owe nothing on that ac-
count. 
Secondarily, Weyerhaeuser argues that Wilson and Empire are 
responsible for the fair rental value of the property. To maintain 
that claim Weyerhaeuser would have to show that Wilson or Empire 
had come into actual possession of the property. Weyerhaeuser did 
not produce any testimony or other evidence to show that Wilson 
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had ever occupied or had any use whatever of the property what-
ever. By failing to so prove, Weyerhaeuser failed to prove the ele-
ments of its counterclaim for set off, and the counterclaim was prop-
erty dismissed. 
The property in question was actually occupied by a holdover 
tenant, Mr. Papworth. Mr. Wilson received no rental payments from 
Mr. Papworth. Because Mr. Papworth had possession of the property 
during the time in question, it is to him that Weyerhaeuser should 
look for payment for the rental value of the property. Indeed, Wey-
erhaeuserfiled suit against Mr. Papworth to recover the past rents. 
(The Fourth District Court file was introduced in the present ligita-
tion.) 
Weyerhaeuser cannot property look to Mr. Wilson to collect the 
rental amounts from Mr. Papworth, as there is no enforceable rela-
tionship between Wilson and Papworth. Were Mr. Wilson to bring 
suit against Mr. Papworth for the amounts of rent owing, Mr. Pap-
worth could properly seek dismissal of the suit by Mr. Wilson be-
cause Mr. Wilson is not the real party in interest. (The real party in 
interest in an action against Mr. Papworth is Weyerhaeuser, the 
property owner. Mr. Wilson owns nothing at all.) Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Papworth are not in privity of contract, as he is a holdover ten-
ant and any contract he may have passed to Weyerhaeuser and not 
to Wilson, and Wilson and Papworth are not in privity of estate, as 
Mr. Wilson received no estate in land at all from the Scotts. 
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POINT V 
ALL PARTIES NECESSARY FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF THIS CASE 
WERE BEFORE THE COURT, AND EMPIRE WAS THE REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST. 
Weyerhaeuser argues that additional parties were necessary 
for the fair adjudication of the cause of action claimed by Empire 
against them. Specifically, Weyerhaeuser asserts that P. Scott Con-
struction Company, the grantor to Wilson, and Papworth, the tenant 
were indispensable parties. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19, how-
ever, does not require that every conceivable party be joined; rather, 
the rule only requires to be joined those whose presence is required 
for a full and fair determination of that party's rights as well as the 
rights of the other parties to the suit. Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock 
Transfer Co.. 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984). 
In Cowen the appealing party argued that another entity was 
essential to a proper adjudication of the case. The court explained 
that the purpose of the rule is "to guard against the entry of judg-
ments which might prejudice the rights of such parties in their ab-
sence." Cowen. at 114. (The court held that the party sought to be 
necessary by the appealing side was not indispensable.) 
In the action before this court the only issue under considera-
tion is whether or not Weyerhaeuser is entitled to retain the monies 
it received from Empire on behalf of Wilson. That claim can be fully 
adjudicated without reference to Papworth, the holdover tenant. In-
deed, Weyerhaeuser has shown by filing suit against Papworth with-
out joining Wilson or Empire, that the dispute concerning the rental 
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value of the property occupied by Papworth is between him and 
Weyerhaeuser, and does not concern Wilson or Empire. Federal Gas, 
Oil & Coal Co. v. Cassadv, 56 F. Supp 824 (ED Ky 1943). 
In the same vein, any claim against Scott for misrepresentation 
in the purchase does not affect the claims that Empire has against 
Weyerhaeuser—the claims are entirely separate. A judgment against 
Weyerhaeuser does not affect the rights of Scott, nor does a judg-
ment in Scott's absence affect the rights of Weyerhaeuser. 
Additionally, if Weyerhaeuser feels that Scott has some liability 
for the amounts that Weyerhaeuser must return to Empire, Weyer-
haeuser could have brought him in through third-party practice. 
Weyerhaeuser also argues that Empire is not the real party in 
interest, but that Empire's errors and omission carrier, Shand Mora-
han & Company, was the real party in interest. The nature of the 
relationship between Shand Morahan and Empire is not of concern to 
Weyerhaeuser. Weyerhaeuser's attempt to have Shand Morahan 
converted into a real party in interest because it covers Empires 
losses breaches the collateral source rule. 
In Dubois v. Nve. 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978) our Supreme Court 
explained that "defendants cannot avoid liability on the ground that 
the damage had been paid for by the insurance company. The collat-
eral source rule provides that a wrongdoer is not entitled to have 
damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff 
has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss 
from an independent collateral source." 
For Shand Morahan to be deemed the real party in interest in 
this litigation, Weyerhaeuser would have to show that, under the 
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terms of the insurance agreement between Empire and Shand Mora-
han, Shand Morahan receives absolute subrogation for the losses that 
it pays. Weyerhaeuser introduced no such evidence, and never at-
tempted to obtain the same through regular discovery. Without evi-
dence that Shand has any interest in the litigation at all beyond its 
payment on behalf of Empire as a collateral source, Shand is not a 
real party in interest. 
Should by some chance Shand Morahan file suit against Wey-
erhaeuser to also recover the amounts in question here, Shand would 
be subject to Weyerhaeuser's defenses against Empire, from which 
Shand would derive all of its recovery rights. Payment would obvi-
ously be an absolute defense. 
POINT VI 
EMPIRE PROVED ITS ALLEGATIONS WITH THE REQUISITE SPECI-
FICITY 
Weyerhaeuser asserts that the damages Empire seeks to collect 
were speculative, and for that reason not recoverable. Specifically, 
Weyerhaeuser claims that Empire did not establish that Wilson actu-
ally paid any money to Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company, or that 
Empire paid all of the money for which it seeks reimbursement. 
Weyerhaeuser, in its answer to Plaintiffs complaint (Record on Ap-
peal at page 99) admits that it received Empire's check in the amount 
of $5473.04, and further admits that it negotiated the check and kept 
the funds. Those admissions, coupled with the fact that no deed of 
trust existed to be assumed, present the prima facie case. Whether 
the funds in question came from Wilson or any other source is not 
essential to the outcome of the case—the amounts were tendered to 
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Weyerhaeuser by Empire, and it is Empire that seeks their return in 
this action. Additionally, as explained previously, Empire is under no 
obligation to explain where it got the money to reimburse Wilson. 
Empire is the real party in interest and the reimbursement source is 
not an issue in this litigation. 
POINT VII 
EMPIRE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES EXPENDED IN THE EXECU-
TION OF ITS JUDGMENT AGAINST WEYERHAEUSER 
The Court's judgment in this litigation included a provision that 
will allow Empire to recover from Weyerhaeuser attorneys' fees that 
are expended in the execution of the judgment rendered. There is no 
award for attorney's fees expended prior to the entry of the judg-
ment. 
Attorney's fees on an execution of a judgment should be con-
sidered necessary costs incurred in the enforcement of the judgment 
and, for that reason, should be the responsibility of the party whose 
refusal to pay the judgment already rendered necessitates the exe-
cution proceeding. In the current case, Weyerhaeuser can avoid all 
liability for the award of attorney's fees by simply paying the judg-
ment without forcing Empire to resort to execution proceedings. 
Both the Third Circuit and the Fourth District Court rules permit 
the recovery of attorney's fees for executions in the case of default 
judgments. (Fourth District Administrative Order 23, Third Circuit 
Rules H-87-l:4). If attorneys' fees accrued in collection of a default 
judgment are permissible, they must also be permissible in collection 
of a judgment obtained after trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Empire's complaint against Weyerhaeuser was based upon the 
contents of the beneficiary statement prepared by Weyerhaeuser. 
Because this was an action based on a writing it fell within the cov-
erage of the six year statute of limitation. The deed of trust that Em-
pire attempted to assume was no longer in existense at the time of 
the attempted assumption. Wilson, Empire's client, never took pos-
session or had the use of the subject property—it was continuously 
occupied by a holdover tenant who made no payments to Wilson. 
For these reasons Empire requests that the judgment of the Court 
below be affirmed by this Court and the cause dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. 
MARK F.ROBINSON 
CLAUDE E. ZOBELL, JR. 
Attorneys for Empire Title Company. 
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